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Abstract 
This study examined the effects of a lawyer’s age, gender, and goals on biases in jury 
decisions. Participants read the closing arguments of a lawyer in a case involving libel. I 
hypothesized that female attorneys would be less influential than male attorneys would overall, 
and especially in conditions where the attorney is older and the goal is agentic. To test this 
hypothesis, participants were randomly assigned to read a statement made by either a male or a 
female attorney, who was either 30 or 55 years old, as indicated through a biographical note. 
Additionally, the note specified that the attorney was either working for compensation and thus 
had an agentic goal (focused on the self), or was working pro bono and thus had a communal 
goal (focused on the community). After reading the attorney’s argument, participants evaluated 
the attorney and the attorney’s message. Overall, the perceived competence and persuasiveness 
of the attorney was the most influential characteristic affecting opinion. Male participants 
perceived female attorneys as more competent than male attorneys, and female participants 
perceived male attorneys as more competent than female attorneys. Thus, men were more 
persuaded by female attorney, and women were more persuaded by men. 
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The jury has the power to decide whether someone is innocent or guilty, and can decide 
matters of life and death. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate potential biases of juries. The 
proper jury is fair and impartial, because ideally that jury is chosen from a diverse pool that is 
meant to ensure “counterbalancing of biases” or canceling out individual biases (Hastie, Penrod 
& Pennington, 1983). Yet a variety of factors can affect jury decisions. Juror characteristics such 
as gender, religion, education level, socio-economic status (Hastie et al., 1983; Wrighstman, 
Kassim & Willis, 1987), and racial prejudices (Urszbat, 2004) affect juror judgments. 
Characteristics of other actors, such as defendants and lawyers, also affect jury decision making. 
For example, defendants’ nonverbal remorsefulness (Corwin, Cramer, Griffin & Brodsky, 2012) 
and gender and age (Pazzulo, Dempsey, Meader & Allen, 2010) affect decisions, and lawyers’ 
intonation, posture, attractiveness, confidence, and credibility affect juries’ perception of them 
and their arguments (Linz & Penrod, 1984; Lubet, 1997; Elliot, 2011, Voss, 2011). To test if 
“counterbalancing of biases” exists, especially non-case-relevant biases, we need to examine the 
mechanisms through which these biases form.  
Biases are a result of stereotypes that form about in-groups—social groups we identify 
with and to which we belong—and out-groups—social groups with which we have no affiliation. 
People form stereotypes about people in out-groups by first imposing a category on those 
individuals. Categorization is a natural cognitive process that cannot be avoided (Stangor, 2000). 
These categorizations are automatic processes that result from the fact that people are cognitive 
misers, and as a result, they rely on heuristics that allow them to judge people quickly with 
limited information.  
Stereotypes are often construed based on ratings of competence and warmth (Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002; Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009) or agency and 
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communion (for review Carli, in press). These competence-warmth dimensions include 
descriptions such as friendly, helpful, and genial to describe warmth, and labels such as skillful, 
apt, and capable to describe competence. Women, men, professionals and the elderly receive 
different ratings on warmth and competence dimensions (Cuddy et al., 2009). Women rate higher 
in the warmth dimension, but they rate lower in the competence dimension, when compared to 
men. Classifications of women and men along the agency/communion dimensions show similar 
results: Cross-cultural research reveals considerable agreement in the stereotypes—with people 
judging women to have communal qualities, such as kindness, helpfulness, and warmth, and men 
to have agentic qualities such as assertiveness, directness, and competence (Williams & Best, 
1990). Similarly, older people receive higher ratings on the warmth dimension but lower ratings 
on the competence dimension (Cuddy, Norton & Fiske, 2005).  
Women and men have different gender stereotypes associated with them. The descriptive 
stereotypes, or stereotypes that describe the way individuals of different genders act, include the 
perception that women are viewed as less competent, but warmer, than men. The prescriptive 
stereotypes, or stereotypes that describe how individuals of different genders should behave, 
include the prescription that women are supposed to behave in a communal manner that is 
friendly, caring, and empathetic. Conversely, men are supposed to act in an assertive manner.  
Women and men are penalized for acting in ways that violate their prescriptions (for review, see 
Carli, in press). 
Stereotypes affect evaluations of people and therefore play a role in persuasion. 
Persuasion is based on credibility or believability, which is affected by expertise or competence, 
and by trustworthiness and goodwill or caring (Gass & Seiter, 2010; for review, see Carli, in 
press).  Thus, credibility derives from the competence and warmth dimensions that define 
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cultural stereotypes—expertise, the ability of a source to provide true and accurate information, 
and trustworthiness, acting without bias or self-interest (Chaiken, 1979, for review, see Carli, in 
press). Individuals who are perceived as higher in expertise are viewed as more persuasive (Gass 
& Seiter, 2010), as are individuals who appear to be and who seem to care about others. A 
lawyer has to be perceived as competent and credible in order to be able to persuade the jury 
(Linz & Penrod, 1984).  
Gender Effects on Persuasion 
Because of gender stereotyping, gender affects persuasiveness. Compared to men, 
women are not as convincing in the courtroom (Nelson, 2004; Hahn & Clayton, 1996). Overall, 
men are more likely than women to be hired as attorneys (Hodgson & Pryor, 1984) and, with 
some exceptions (Cohen & Peterson, 1981), male attorneys are more successful in winning their 
cases than female attorneys (Elliott, 2011).  Hahn and Clayton (1996) found that compared to 
passive attorneys, attorneys engaging in an aggressive presentation style were more successful; 
however, women manifesting an aggressive style did not gain the same advantages as men, and 
overall they were less successful at obtaining the desired verdict. Women who are assertive and 
aggressive act in ways that are incongruent with their gender roles, which dictate that women 
should be warm and kind, and they are penalized for that incongruence (for review Carli, in 
press).  
Other evidence that juries might be biased in their evaluation of attorneys comes from 
research on perception of expert witnesses. In one study, expert-witnesses who were rated as 
high both in warmth and in competence were perceived as more credible; women lost more 
credibility than men did when they were not warm, as measured by likability (Neal, Guadagno, 
Eno & Brodsky, 2012). Similarly, in another study, the gender-congruent occupation of a female 
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non-expert lay witness affected the witness’s credibility. Compared to female lay witnesses in 
non-traditional occupations, female lay witnesses in traditional occupations elicited more guilty 
verdicts in the jury; credibility of men was not affected by whether or not they had a gender-
congruent occupation (Maeder, Pozzulo & Dempsey, 2012). Thus, women receive lower ratings 
on the competence dimension than men do, but they have higher ratings in the warmth dimension 
(Cuddy et al., 2009), and when they behave in ways that are not congruent with their stereotype 
they are penalized for it with loss of credibility and the resulting social influence. Female 
attorneys are not only in an occupation that is stereotypically male, but if they lack warmth, by 
behaving too assertive or lacking empathy, they will likely lose credibility, unlike male 
attorneys. 
Although women are generally perceived as less competent than men, women are 
perceived as more competent than men, and more likely to be hired by a client, in cases dealing 
with divorce, child custody, sexual harrassment rape, and discrimination (Bennet & Hischhorn, 
1993 as cited in Nelson, 2004). For example, a study revealed an effect of the defense attorney’s 
gender in a rape case: The acquittal rate was significantly higher when the defense attorney was a 
woman than when the defense attorney was a man (Villemur & Hyde, 1983). These results 
suggest that the topic of the trial might moderate the effect of attorney’s gender. Women are 
more likely to exert influence in family and sexual harassment cases because both men and 
women are more influential when talking about topics that are stereotypicallly associated with 
their gender (for review Carli, in press). The femininity or masculinity of a topic potentially acts 
as a moderator to the gender effects in negotiations as well (Bear & Babcock, 2012). Therefore, 
in order to assess possible gender biases independent of topic, the case topic has to be gender-
neutral.  
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Credibility of attorneys affects their persuasiveness within the courtroom (Linz & Perod, 
1984), which in turn affects their ability to elicit a desired verdict for their clients. Women gain 
credibility when the trial topic is related to family life or sexual harassment. Women are 
perceived to be more competent in these topics as it is assumed that they have had more 
experience within the topic, such as the belief that women are mothers. In addition, women are 
supposed to act in a feminine manner within the courtroom by avoiding confrontational or 
aggressive argumentation style. They are supposed to be warm and understanding to the other 
actors within the courtroom. 
Age, Stereotypes and Persuasion 
Similar to women, older people receive higher ratings on the warmth dimension but 
lower ratings on the competence dimension (Cuddy & Fiske, 2002; Cuddy et al., 2009). Thus the 
elderly are viewed as warm and likable, but relatively incompetent. In addition, the elderly elicit 
pity in younger people (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002) and these feelings make the elderly 
appear warm, unthreatening and incompetent (Cuddy et al., 2009).  The elderly are often 
associated with deficiencies that may include impaired physical or cognitive abilities (Castelli, 
Zecchini, Deamicis & Sherman, 2005). In addition, one study found that the elderly were viewed 
as warmer and friendlier when they were perceived as less competent (Cuddy, Norton & Fiske, 
2005). This study suggests that the elderly are expected to lack competence, and that they are 
socially penalized for being competent. 
To summarize, gender and age stereotypes dictate desired behaviors for people. Women 
and the elderly are supposed to be communal, supportive of others in the community, and not 
agentic, or self-interested. Women, but not men, are penalized when they assertively bargain for 
themselves, but not when they are assertively bargaining for others (Amanatullah & Morris, 
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2010; Tinsley, Cheldelin, Schneider & Amanatullah, 2009; Bowles, Babcock & McGinn, 2005) 
because bargaining for oneself is viewed as lacking concern for others, but bargaining on behalf 
of someone else is not. Evaluators of agentic women focus on deficits in social skills, as opposed 
to competence, when making hiring decisions (Phelan, Moss-Racusin & Rudman,2008), which 
suggests that warmth for women is valued more than competence. In addition, younger people 
penalize older people for acting in a manner that is incongruent with the prescriptive-stereotype, 
or acting in a way in which they should not act (North & Fiske, 2013).  
  Current Study 
The current study will examine the effect of gender, age, and goal on persuasiveness of 
attorneys. The current study is an experiment in which the participants will be presented with an 
attorney’s closing arguments. The attorney will be either male or female, who is described as 
younger or older, and who is motivated by communal or agentic goals. Communal goals involve 
unselfishly helping others or the community as a whole, while agentic goals are driven by self-
interest, such as gaining money, power and influence. Because women are expected to be 
communal, rather than agentic, women who appear to be motivated by communal goals are 
likely to be viewed more favorably than women who appear to be motivated by agentic goals.  
Research has shown that men are more influential when arguing for masculine topics, 
while females are more influential while arguing for feminine topics (for review Carli, in press). 
Thus, to eliminate the potential confound created by using a gendered topic, a pretest was 
conducted to select a gender-neutral topic to be used in the primary study. Because no previous 
research has specifically identified the stereotypes for the elderly versus the non-elderly, a 
second pretest was conducted to establish descriptive stereotypes of professionals based on the 
professional’s age and gender. A third pretest was conducted to determine what participants 
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considered to be the age at which a person would be categorized as a younger or as an older 
professional. A fourth pretest was conducted to determine what the prescriptive stereotypes are 
for professionals, based on the professionals’ age and gender.  A fifth pretest was conducted, 
using modified recordings of the closing arguments, to test whether an audiotape of the 
attorney’s arguments could be used to manipulate the attorney’s gender.  
Pretest 1: Gender typing of topic 
Participants. Subjects (N = 71, Mage = 32.44, age range: 19 - 61, SD = 10.44) were self-
selected through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were paid a $1.00 for their 
participation, which is in line with the MTurk standards. The subject pool comprised women (N 
= 32, Mage = 33.06, age range: 19-54, SD = 10.25) and men (N = 39, Mage = 31.92, age range: 20 
-60, SD = 10.70).   
Procedure. Participants rated the masculinity and femininity of 30 topics, including 
topics such as libel and slander, sexual harassment, rape, homicide, battery (see Appendix A). 
For each topic, the participants were asked six questions to assess the masculinity and femininity 
of the topic, their interest and knowledge concerning the topic, and their views about whether the 
person accused of the crime would be guilty and whether the person who brought the suit to 
court was justified in doing so.  Participants answered the six questions using a 5-item Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (highly). 
Results. The t-test for dependent means (Table 1) revealed that the only topics for which 
the ratings of masculinity and femininity were not statistically significant were sexual 
harassment, freedom of speech, libel and slander, rape, child abuse, civil rights, immigration, 
consumer protection, defendant’s rights and traffic violations. However, after eliminating topics 
that revealed gender differences in knowledge (Table 2), interest (Table 3), preconceived guilt 
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(Table 4) and lawsuit justification (Table 5), the only five topics that remained feasible were 
freedom of speech, libel and slander, consumer protection, immigration and defendant’s rights. 
For this study, I picked libel and slander. 
Pretest 2: Descriptive stereotypes about older versus younger professionals 
Participants. Subjects (N = 274, Mage = 30.78, age range: 18-72, SD =9.31) were self-
selected through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were paid a $0.50 for their 
participation, which is in line with the MTurk standards. The subject pool comprised women (N 
= 115, Mage = 32.00, age range: 18-60, SD =10.35) and men (N = 159, Mage = 29.91, age range: 
19-72, SD =8.40).   
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: younger male 
professional, younger female professional, older male professional, or older female professional.  
Stereotypes of professionals based on gender and age were assessed using a 30-item survey that 
provided adjectives such as competent, proficient, expert, caring, kind, friendly (Appendix B). 
Participants were asked how descriptive each adjective was of either male or female, younger or 
older professionals. Ratings were made on a 5-item Likert scale with endpoints 1 (not at all) to 5 
(highly).  
Results. A measure of competence was created by a averaging the ratings of traits 
reflecting competence: competent, proficient, expert, intelligent, skillful, accomplished, decisive, 
self- confident, have analytic ability, industrious, leader-like, independent, desire autonomy, 
ambitious, self-reliant. A 2 (Age of Professional) X 2 (Gender of Professional) X 2 (Participant 
Gender) between subjects ANOVA was conducted on this measure of competence. Overall, 
professionals were rated as high in competence (M = 3.82). Results revealed a significant main 
effect of age of the professional, F (1, 266) = 14.54, p < 0.001, ηp
2 
= 0.052, and a significant 
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main effect of gender of professional, F (1, 266) = 3.94, p = 0.05, ηp
2 
= 0.015.  Participants rated 
older professionals (M = 3.96) as more competent than younger professionals (M = 3.68). 
Additionally, participants rated female professionals (M = 3.75) as less competent than male 
professionals (M = 3.90). There were no other main effects or interactions on the measure of 
competence (Table 6). 
 A measure of warmth was created by averaging the ratings of traits reflecting warmth: 
friendly, gentle, kind, sympathetic, sincere, caring, aware of feelings of others, have a desire to 
avoid controversy, have a need for social acceptance, sociable, understanding, tolerant, warm, 
generous, and helpful. A 2 (Age of professional) X 2 (Gender of Professional) X 2 (Participant 
Gender) between subjects ANOVA was conducted on the measure of warmth. Overall, 
professionals were rated as neutral on the measure of warmth (M = 3.16).  There was a 
significant main effect of gender of professional, F (1, 266) = 55.36, p < 0.001, ηp
2 
= 0.172. 
Participants rated female professionals (M = 3.46) as warmer than male professionals (M = 2.86). 
There was also a significant Age of Professional X Participant Gender interaction, F (1, 266) = 
3.82, p = 0.05, ηp
2 
= 0.014. Women rated younger professionals (M = 3.23) as warmer than older 
professionals (M = 2.94); conversely, men rated older professionals (M = 3.24) as warmer than 
younger professionals (M = 3.21).  Furthermore, there was a significant Gender of Professional 
X Participant Gender interaction, F (1, 266) = 10.29, p < 0.01, ηp
2 
= 0.037.  Female professionals 
were rated higher by women (M = 3.52) but lower by men (M = 3.40); conversely, male 
professionals were rated higher by men (M = 3.06), but lower by women (M = 2.66). There were 
no other significant main effects or interactions on the measure of warmth (Table 7). The 
descriptiveness of competence and warmth varied based on gender, and descriptiveness of 
competence varied also based on the age of the target group. These results are consistent with the 
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research of Cuddy et al. (2009) on stereotypes based on gender, but not those based on age. 
Contrary to women who were rated lower in competence but higher in warmth, the elderly 
professionals received higher ratings in competence, and there was no significant difference in 
the ratings of warmth for younger and older professionals. 
Pretest 3: Perceived age of old and young professionals 
Participants. Subjects (N = 47, Mage = 31.77, age range: 21-62, SD =9.61) were self-
selected through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were paid a $0.10 for their 
participation, which is in line with the MTurk standards. The subject pool comprised women (N 
= 18, Mage = 34.00, age range: 21-52, SD =9.38) and men (N = 29, Mage = 30.38, age range: 21-
62, SD=9.64).   
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to either female professional or male 
professional condition and were asked to indicate how old they thought a professional of that 
gender would be if they were younger or older. (See Appendix C). 
Results. A 2 (Age of professional) X 2 (Gender of Professional) mixed model ANOVA 
was conducted on the measure of approximate age, with age treated as a repeated measure 
between younger and older professional, and gender of the professional as a between subjects 
variable. The ANOVA revealed no significant Age X Gender interaction, F (1, 45) 
= 0.02, p = 0.89. The participants assigned a younger professional a mean age of 24.57 years 
(median=25, age range: 16 - 32) and an older professional with a mean age of 52.09 (median = 
50, age range: 24 - 80).  Since there are not many attorneys who are 25 and under due to the 
required seven years of post-secondary education for lawyers, I have decided to age of the 
younger attorney to 30. The other cut-off was rounded up to the nearest 5 years, therefore 
making the older attorney 55 years old. 
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Pretest 4: Prescriptive stereotypes about older versus younger professionals 
Participants. Subjects (N = 284, Mage = 31.99, age range: 19 - 69, SD = 10.58) were self-
selected through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were paid a $0.50 for their 
participation, which is in line with the MTurk standards.  The subject pool comprised women (N 
= 118, Mage = 34.06, age range: 20 - 68, SD = 11.58) and men (N = 166, Mage = 30.52, age range: 
19 - 69, SD = 9.58).   
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one out of four categories: younger 
male professional, younger female professional, older male professional, or older female 
professional.  Stereotypes of professionals based on gender and age were assessed using a 30 
item survey that provided adjectives such as competent, proficient, expert, caring, kind, friendly 
(Appendix D). Participants were asked how desirable each adjective would be in either a male or 
a female, younger or older professional. Ratings were made on a 5-item Likert scale with 
endpoints 1 (not at all) to 5 (highly). 
Results. A measure of competence was created by a averaging the ratings of traits 
reflecting competence: competent, proficient, expert, intelligent, skillful, accomplished, decisive, 
self- confident, have analytic ability, industrious, leader-like, independent, desire autonomy, 
ambitious, self-reliant. A 2 (Age of professional) X 2 (Gender of Professional) X 2 (Participant 
Gender) between subjects ANOVA was conducted on this measure of competence. Overall, 
participants rated competence as highly desirable (M = 4.08). Results revealed a significant 
Gender of Professional X Participant Gender interaction, F (1, 276) = 5.23, p = 0.02, ηp
2 
= 0.019. 
Women rated female professionals higher (M = 4.13) than male professionals (M = 4.04); 
conversely, men rated male professionals higher (M = 4.20) than female professionals (M = 3.95) 
There were no other significant main effects or interactions (See Table 8). 
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A measure of warmth was created by averaging the ratings of traits reflecting warmth, 
such as friendly, gentle, kind, sympathetic, sincere, caring, aware of feelings of others, have a 
desire to avoid controversy, have a need for social acceptance, sociable, understanding, tolerant, 
warm, generous, helpful. A 2 (Age of professional) X 2 (Gender of Professional) X 2 (Participant 
Gender) between subjects ANOVA was conducted on the measure of warmth. Overall, 
participants rated warmth as somewhat desirable (M = 3.69). There was no significant main 
effects or interactions. The prescriptiveness of competence and warmth for professionals did not 
vary based on gender or age (Table 9). 
Pretest 5: Stimuli – Perceived Gender of the Audiotaped Attorney 
Participants. Subjects (N = 44, Mage = 30.82, age range: 18 - 61, SD = 10.89) were self-
selected through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were paid a $0.20 for their 
participation, which is in line with the MTurk standards. The subject pool comprised women (N 
= 11, Mage = 38.27, age range: 25-54, SD =10.37) and men (N = 33, Mage = 28.33, age range: 18 - 
69, SD =10.01).   
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one out of two categories: high-
pitched voice recording (female) and the low-pitch recording (male). The participants assessed 
the gender of the speaker, overall quality of the recording, and how natural was the voice 
(Appendix E).  
Results. The Pearson Chi-Square analysis revealed no significant association between the 
pitch alternatives (high for female and low for male) and the gender assigned to the speaker by 
the participants  (χ2 (1, N = 44) = 1.69, p = 0.19). Since there was no significant association 
between the pitch manipulation and the perceived gender of the speaker, the main study did not 
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include the audio recording as a prime for gender; instead, a biographical note was used as a 
prime for gender. 
Main Study: Hypotheses 
Based on the results of the pretests, the topic selected for the main study was libel, the 
age of the young attorney was chosen to be 30 and the old attorney was chosen to be 55. In 
addition, the pretest of the prescriptive stereotypes revealed that there are main effects of age and 
gender on competence dimension, and a main effect of gender on the warmth dimension.  Based 
on these results and previous findings on gender differences in social influence, the following 
hypotheses were made. 
Hypothesis 1. Women will be less persuasive than men. 
Hypothesis 2. Elderly attorneys will differ in persuasiveness from younger attorneys.  
The goal of the lawyer will be manipulated as either communal (working pro-bono and 
without compensation), or as agentic (representing a client for compensation). This would mean 
that women who are in the pro-bono representation condition would be more consistent with the 
female gender stereotype, which might decrease the social penalty for being a professional 
woman. I hypothesized that women with a communal goal will be rated as more persuasive 
compared to women with an agentic goal, because women are penalized when they assertively 
bargain for themselves, but not when they are assertively bargaining for others.  
Hypothesis 3. Women and the elderly with a communal goal will differ in persuasiveness 
compared to women and the elderly with an agentic goal. 
Hypothesis 4. Men with an agentic goal will differ in persuasiveness from women with 
an agentic goal. 
Main Study Method 
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 Participant Characteristics. Subjects (N = 524, Mage = 29.92, age range: 18 - 49, SD = 
7.00) were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk, and they were paid a $0.50 for their 
participation, which is in line with the MTurk standards. Of these subject 206 were women (Mage 
= 30.69, age range: 18 - 49, SD = 7.03) and 316 were men (Mage = 29.39, age range: 18 - 49, SD 
= 6.95). The 524 subjects self-identified their racial and ethnic background: There were 324 
White/Caucasian Americans, 140 Asian-Americans, 28 Black/African-Americans, 14 
Hispanic/Latino-Americans, 3 Native American/ Pacific Islanders, and 8 mixed-race individuals. 
Additionally, 7 participants did not disclose their racial or ethnic background. 
Procedure. The participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions based on 
a 2 (Attorney’s Gender) x 2 (Attorney’s Age) x 2 (Attorney’s Goal) factorial design. Participants 
read a short description of the attorney that included the attorney’s name, age and the type of 
representation (Appendix H). The attorney was identified as either Chris or Christine Johnson, 
depending on the gender condition, who was either 30 or 55 years of age and who was either 
representing her/his client pro bono (without compensation) or on contingency (the attorney 
would be compensated if the case was won). For example, participants read, “On the following 
screen, you will read closing arguments made by Christine Johnson, an attorney with Carter and 
Johnson, LLP. She is a 30-year-old attorney from Illinois. She is representing the plaintiff, Eric 
Jones, pro bono, meaning that the she is not being compensated for representing the client.”  
Then, participants read the attorney‘s closing arguments for the plaintiff in a libel suit (Appendix 
D). Following the passage, the participants completed an opinion measure, indicating how much 
they agreed that the defendant in the case was guilty of libel. Ratings were made on a 7-point 
scale with endpoints 1 (disagree completely) and 7 (agree completely). Higher scores indicated 
greater persuasiveness of the attorney. Participants also answered an 18-item scale (Appendix G) 
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that asked them to evaluate the attorney on four clusters of traits: persuasiveness, 
dominance/threat, competence/agency, and communion. The persuasiveness cluster contained 
the traits persuasive, powerful, influential, charismatic, and leader-like; the dominance threat 
cluster contained the traits arrogant, aggressive, and intimidating; the competence/agentic cluster 
consisted of the traits competent, knowledgeable, effective, confident, and assertive, and 
communion cluster included the traits likeable, compassionate, genuine, trustworthy, and 
sympathetic was the attorney. An 8-item questionnaire measured their perception of the 
arguments used by the attorney. It assessed how compelling, thorough, clear, logical, emotional, 
passionate, dry and boring the argument was on a 7- point Likert scale with endpoints of 1 (not at 
all) and 7 (highly) (Appendix G). Finally, the participants were asked to answer 4-item 
manipulation check questionnaire (Appendix G). They had to indicate whether the attorney was 
representing a person who was accusing someone of libel (the plaintiff), or whether the attorney 
was representing the person accused of libel (the defendant). They also had to indicate the gender 
of the attorney, the age of the attorney, and whether the attorney was working for pay or pro 
bono. 
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Measurement and Coding. Of the 1600 participants tested, 524 participants were used 
for data analyses.
 1
 Participants answered 27 questions on the 7- item Likert scale. Participant 
self-identified their gender as well as their racial and ethnic background through a text entry.  
Participant gender was coded as either male, female or unknown/other.   
Main Study Results  
Factor Analysis on Attorney Evaluation Questionnaire. In order to confirm the 
theoretical clusters presented in the Method, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted for the 
attorney evaluation questionnaire.  A principal axis factor analysis (PAF) with a varimax 
(orthogonal) rotation was conducted on the 18 items assessing the attorney. The data used in the 
factor analysis were based on the 474 participants who answered all of the items included in the 
ratings of the attorney. An examination of the Kaiser-Meyer Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy (KMO = 0.94) and a significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ2 (325) = 6363.73, p < 
0.001) indicated that the items were factorable.  
                                                          
1
 Strict criteria were used on the manipulation checks to ensure that all subjects fully attended to 
and understood the 3 manipulations of the independent variables (Attorney Age, Attorney 
Gender and Attorney Goal) as well as the passage that they were instructed to read. Passage 
understanding, and the Attorney Gender and Attorney Goal were assessed using a question with 
two possible multiple-choice answers. The Attorney Age manipulation check was assessed 
through a text entry were the participant wrote what they thought was the age of the attorney and 
they were coded as younger attorney if they entered any age within 25 - 35 range and older 
attorney when they entered any age within the 50 - 60 range. Participants were eliminated from 
the study if they failed to answer the manipulation checks correctly.  
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Results revealed three factors: persuasive, powerful, influential, leader-like, 
knowledgeable, competent, effective, confident, assertive loaded on Factor 1, creating a scale 
measuring the attorney’s persuasiveness-competence (Table 10). Arrogant, aggressive, and 
intimidating loaded on Factor 2, creating a scale measuring the attorney’s dominance. Likable, 
charismatic, compassionate, genuine, trustworthy, and sympathetic loaded on Factor 3, creating a 
scale measuring the attorney’s communion. Scores on each scale were computed by taking the 
mean of the items included in each scale. Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities were conducted for the 
scales.  The nine items in the persuasiveness-competence scale (α = 0 .91) and six items in the 
communion scale (α = 0.83) were highly reliable. The three items in the dominance scale had 
lower reliability (α = 0.55), but that was likely due to the low number of items on this scale.  
Factor Analysis on Message Evaluation Questionnaire. An exploratory factor analysis 
was conducted for the message evaluation questionnaire.  A principal axis factor (PAF) with a 
varimax (orthogonal) rotation was conducted on the eight items rating evaluating the message 
quality, including compelling, thorough, clear, logical, emotional, passionate, dry, and boring.  
An examination of the Kaiser-Meyer Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO = 0.80) and 
the significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ2 (28) = 1423.14, p < 0.001) indicated that the items 
were factorable. The factor analysis revealed three factors: compelling, thorough, clear, and 
logical loaded on Factor 1, creating a scale measuring the message’s strength (Table 11). 
Emotional and passionate loaded on Factor 2, creating a scale measuring the message’s 
emotional intensity. Lastly, dry, and boring loaded on Factor 3, creating a scale measuring the 
message’s boringness. Scores on each scale were computed by taking the mean of the items 
included in each scale. Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities were conducted for the three scales.  The 
four items in the message strength scale were highly reliable (α = 0.84), and the two items in the 
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message emotional intensity scale (α = 0.63) and the two items in the message boringness scale 
(α = 0.71) were also reliable. 
Effects of Independent Variables on Dependent Variables 
 A 2 (Attorney Age: younger vs. older] X 2 (Attorney Gender: female, male) X 2 
(Attorney Goal: agentic, communal) X 2 (Participant Gender [female, male]) between-subjects 
ANOVAs were conducted on the dependent measures: the opinion measure, persuasiveness-
competence scale, dominance threat scale, communion scale, strength of message scale, 
emotional intensity scale, and boringness scale.  
Ratings of the Message. Overall, the participants rated the message as strong (N = 522, 
M = 6.03, SD = 0.89), emotionally intense (N = 522, M = 4.99, SD = 1.13), and as not boring (N 
= 522, M = 2.95, SD = 1.30). There was a significant Attorney Age X Attorney Gender 
interaction, F (1, 506) = 3.84, p < 0.05 ηp
2 
= 0.008, on the strength of message scale. Older 
women (M = 6.12) were rated higher on strength of message than younger women (M = 5.99). 
Conversely, younger men (M = 6.15) were rated higher on strength of message than older men 
(M = 5.96) (Table 12).  There was a significant Participant Gender X Attorney Goal on the 
measure of emotional intensity, F (1, 506) = 5.12, p < 0.01, ηp
2 
= 0.008.  Women rated attorneys 
working pro bono (M = 5.17) higher than attorneys working for pay (M = 4.88) on the measure 
of emotional intensity. Conversely, men rated attorneys working for pay (M = 5.05) higher than 
those working pro bono (M = 4.91) on the measure of emotional intensity (Table 13). There was 
also a main effect of participant gender on the measure of boringness, F (1, 506) = 7.45, p < 
0.01, ηp
2 
= 0.015. Women (M = 2.73) rated the closing arguments as less boring than men (M  = 
3.05).  There were no other significant main effects or interactions on the measures of strength of 
message, emotional intensity and boringness. There was also a significant Attorney Age X 
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Attorney Gender interaction, F (1, 506) = 8.68, p < 0.01, ηp
2 
= 0.017, on the measure of 
boringness. Participants rated older women (M = 2.59) as less boring than younger women (M = 
3.12). Conversely, participants rated older men (M = 3.01) as more boring than younger men (M 
= 2.84) (Table 14).  
Ratings of the Attorney. The ANOVAs on ratings of the attorney revealed that, overall, 
people rated the attorney as moderately persuasive/competent (N = 522, M = 5.79, SD = 0.83) 
and communal (N = 522, M = 5.12, SD = 0.93), but neutral in dominance (N = 521, M = 4.00, SD 
= 1.08).  The ANOVA on attorney persuasiveness/competence revealed a main effect of the 
gender of the participant, F (1, 506) = 8.69, p < 0.01, ηp
2 
= 0.017. Women rated the attorney to be 
more persuasive/competent (M = 5.93) than men rated them to be (M = 5.71). In addition, there 
was a significant Attorney Gender X Participant Gender interaction, F (1, 506) = 7.75, p < 0.01, 
ηp
2 
= 0.015. Female participants rated the male attorney (M = 6.06) as more 
persuasive/competent than the female attorney (M = 5.80); conversely, and male participants 
rated the female attorney (M = 5.79) as more persuasive/competent than the male attorney (M = 
5.63) (Table 15).  There were no other significant main effects or interactions on the 
persuasiveness/competence measure. The ANOVA on attorney communion revealed only a 
significant main effect of the gender of the participant, F (1, 506) = 12.44, p < 0.001, ηp
2 
= 0.024. 
Women rated the attorneys to be more communal (M = 5.31) than men rated them to be (M = 
5.01) (Table 16). The ANOVA on attorney dominance revealed only one significant effect, a 
main effect of attorney goal, F (1, 505) = 6.415, p = 0.01, ηp
2 =
 0.013; attorneys working for pay 
(the agentic goal) were rated as more dominant (M = 4.12) than attorneys working pro bono 
(with a communal goal) (M = 3.89) (Table 17).  
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Opinion Measure. Analysis of the opinion measure revealed that overall people agreed 
with the attorney (N = 522, M = 6.05, SD = 1.19). The ANOVA revealed a significant Attorney 
Gender X Participant Gender interaction, F (1, 505) = 6.46, p = 0.01, ηp
2 
= 0.13.  Female 
participants agreed more with the male attorney (M = 6.29) than with the female attorney (M = 
6.00); conversely, male participants agreed more with the female attorney (M = 6.15) than with 
male attorneys (M = 5.88) (Table 18).  No other main effects or interactions were obtained.  
Because an interaction between the attorney’s gender and the participants’ gender was 
found for both the opinion measure and the persuasiveness/competence scale, it is possible that 
the perceived persuasiveness/competence was mediating the interaction for opinion. To test this 
possibility, a 2 (Participant Gender) X 2 (Attorney Gender) X 2 (Attorney Age) X 2 (Attorney 
Goal) between subjects ANCOVA was conducted on the opinion measure, with the perceived 
persuasiveness/competence scale as the covariate. Evidence for mediation would be present if 
the interaction between attorney gender and participant gender were reduced to non-significance 
with the covariate included. Results revealed no significant main effects or interactions. Since 
the opinion effects were reduced to nonsignificance, there is evidence of mediation. 
Correlations Among Dependent Variables. Pearson correlation coefficients were computed for 
all the dependent variables (Table 19). The opinion measure was positively correlated with the 
attorney’s persuasiveness/competence and dominance, as well as the message’s strength and 
emotional intensity. Opinion was negatively correlated with how boring the message was 
perceived to be. The attorney’s communion was unrelated to the opinion measure.  
Discussion 
 The Hypotheses  
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The hypotheses that women would be less persuasive and that elderly and younger 
attorneys would differ in persuasiveness were not supported by the data. The hypothesis that 
women and the elderly with the communal goal would differ in persuasiveness from women and 
the elderly with an agentic goal was also not supported. Additionally, the hypothesis that men 
with the agentic goal would differ in persuasiveness from women with the agentic goal was not 
supported. One possible explanation for these nonsignificant results is that there was little 
variability in the ratings of the opinion measure. Nearly 75 percent of the people tested agreed 
completely or almost completely with the attorney. The presence of this ceiling effect is evident 
in Figure 1.  In general, one would expect that there would be more variability of opinion; 
however, within this study the participants overwhelmingly agreed with the attorney.  The 
argument used in the study elicited tremendous sympathy for the plaintiff. Evidence that the 
participants favored the attorney’s position is also apparent in the way they rated the strength of 
the attorney’s message. Overall, the participants rated the message of the attorney as very strong.  
This suggests that in order to test these hypotheses fully, there would have to be a change in the 
closing arguments of the attorney in a way that would ensure more diverse opinions. Perhaps, a 
message that is more controversial or one with a less sympathetic plaintiff might create more 
variability within the opinion measure and allow effects of independent variables to emerge.  
Main Effect of Participant Gender  
Main effects for participant gender were found on how boring the message was and how 
persuasive/competent and communal the attorney was. Women rated the attorneys and the 
message more favorably than men did for all three dependent measures.  One possible 
explanation for these findings is that women are more generous in their evaluation of other 
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people. Previous research has shown that women tend to give others more favorable ratings than 
men do (e.g., Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber, 1995). 
Interactions Involving the Message  
There were several unexpected findings. There was an interaction between attorney’s 
gender and attorney’s age. On the measure of message strength, female attorneys gained an 
advantage as they increased in age, but, on the contrary, men were at a disadvantage as they 
aged. This finding is not consistent with pretest results showing that participants perceived older 
professionals to be generally more competent than younger ones. Nor is this finding consistent 
with previous research showing that the perceived agency of women is undermined by their 
increasing age, but the perceived agency of men is enhanced by theirs (DeArmond et al., 2006). 
Perhaps, the participants were surprised by the strength of the message of the older female 
attorneys and younger male attorneys and thus rated them higher on the measure of message 
strength. The interaction between the attorney age and the attorney gender on the measure of 
message boringness was also unanticipated. Participants rated older women as less boring than 
younger women, conversely, participants rated older men as more boring than younger men. 
Again, perhaps, participants were surprised by the strength of the older female attorney’s 
message, which was rated as was stronger than the message of the younger female attorney. 
Additionally, younger male attorney’s message was perceived as stronger than the older male 
attorney’s message was. Perhaps the surprise at the stereotype violation might have made 
participants pay attention more to the message. 
 Another unexpected finding was the interaction between participant’s gender and the goal 
of the attorney on the ratings of message’s emotional intensity. Women rated attorneys working 
without pay as having a more emotionally intense message than attorneys working for pay, 
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whereas the reverse was true for men, who found the message of the attorney working for pay as 
more emotionally intense compared to the attorney working without pay. The scale of emotional 
intensity included the how passionate and emotional the attorney was. Because women are 
supposed to be communal and men are supposed to be agentic, participants may view the 
attorneys who reflect their gender prescriptions as more passionate and emotional. Women are 
supposed to exhibit communality as expressed through pro bono litigation while men should 
favor agency or working for money. 
Interactions Involving the Ratings of the Attorney and the Opinion Measure 
  The significant main effect of attorney goal, or whether or not the attorney argued the 
case pro bono or on contingency, was not surprising. Attorneys working for pay appeared more 
dominant than attorneys not working without pay did.  The dominance scale reflected how 
aggressive, intimidating and arrogant the attorney was. Clearly, the attorneys working pro bono 
appeared less selfish, and thus less dominant, than attorneys working for pay.  Nevertheless, it 
was surprising that there was no main effect of attorney goal on the communion measure because 
one would expect that the attorney working pro bono might be perceived as more communal, that 
is likable, friendly, trustworthy, and compassionate.  Perhaps, the difference in the two goal 
conditions, one working on contingency and one working pro bono, was not dramatic enough to 
affect the communion rating. In the present study, both attorneys would be bargaining on behalf 
of the plaintiff without pay if the case were lost. Perhaps, if the attorney could be paid upfront or 
was representing himself or herself in a case that argued for a big payout, then the attorney might 
appear more selfish. 
The measure of the attorney’s persuasiveness/competence revealed a significant 
interaction between the gender of the participant and the gender of the attorney. Men found 
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female attorneys more persuasive/competent than male attorneys, and women found male 
attorneys as more persuasive/ competent than female attorneys.  The results of the prescriptive 
stereotypes pretest show that women rated female professionals higher than male professionals, 
and men rated male professionals higher than female professionals on how desirable competence 
was. Therefore, the participants might have held the members of their gender to a higher 
standard than the members of the other gender, which likely resulted in the higher ratings of 
competence for the members of the opposite gender.  This finding is consistent with the cross-
sex context effect, where the person who is being persuaded is persuaded more by members of 
the opposite gender (Ward, Seccombe, Bendel & Carter, 1985).  However, subsequent studies 
have not replicated these findings and instead shown that women are persuaded by men but that 
men resist being persuaded by women and that overall men are more influential (for review 
Carli, 2001; Carli, in press). However, within the context of the courtroom females might have 
gained more persuasiveness in the eyes of men because of bargaining for others and thus 
conforming to their gender prescription.  
A second interaction between the attorney’s gender and the participants’ gender was 
found for the opinion measure. This interaction paralleled the interaction between the attorney’s 
gender and the participants’ gender on the measure of persuasiveness/competence: Women were 
more persuaded by male than female attorneys, and men were more persuaded by male than 
female attorneys. Consequently, attorneys who elicited higher ratings on the measure of 
persuasiveness/competence were also the ones who elicited higher ratings on the measure of 
opinion. The results of the ANCOVA supported the conclusion that persuasiveness/competence 
mediated the opinion measure. This means that the perceived competence of the attorneys 
affected the opinion measure, or more specifically, that the attorneys who were perceived as 
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highly persuasive/competent were, in fact, influential. This finding is in line with past research 
indicating that in order to be persuasive you have to be perceived as competent (Gass & Seiter, 
2010; Linz & Penrod, 1984). 
However, what is unprecedented is that communion did not play much of a role when it 
came to opinion, as previous research has shown (e.g., Chaiken, 1979). There was no association 
between perceived communion and the opinion measure. Moreover, there was also no main 
effect of goal on the communion scale. Female attorneys were not perceived as less communal 
when working for pay than pro bono. One possible explanation for this lack of effect is that, for 
the most part, attorneys, especially female attorneys, were not penalized for their lack of 
communion because they were bargaining for others, which lets women escape the social 
penalties for behaving agentically in negotiations (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Tinsley, 
Cheldelin, Schneider & Amanatullah, 2009; Bowles, Babcock & McGinn, 2005). Within the 
courtroom, and within the hypothetical case used within this study, the attorney represents 
someone who does not have the skills necessary to represent themselves. Therefore, the attorney 
by sharing the skill with the community, is behaving communally, even he or she is being 
compensated. Therefore, the goal manipulation has to be more dramatic, and perhaps making the 
distinctions between a communal goal and the agentic goal more extreme would make the type 
of goal more salient. For instance, instead of presenting the attorneys as working pro bono or on 
contingency, as was done in the present study, the attorney could be presented as working pro 
bono or with payment upfront. Payment upfront would make the attorney appear more 
materialistic.  
Further Studies 
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Future studies should try to find closing arguments that will elicit a greater variability of 
opinion. For instance, the attorney could represent a client whose case is not viewed favorably 
within the United States, such as a case involving a politician who is accused of corruption or 
criminal negligence. Of course, the topic of the case would still have to remain gender-neutral. 
Perhaps, a case that is not as straightforward as the libel and slander case used in this study might 
also create more variability within the opinion measure. Similarly, the attorney could allude to 
the argument of the opposing attorney was, possibly as a brief rebuttal. However, the rebuttal 
would have to be done carefully because it might make the jurors consider factors that are 
outside of the scope of the study. In addition to modifying the opinion measure, the attorney 
goal, gender and age need to be more salient. 
Future studies could pose the manipulation of attorney’s goal as pro bono versus payment 
upfront, as I suggested earlier. However, the attorney could also be a public defender or a 
prosecutor with the district attorney’s office, who was assigned the case, and who would be paid 
the same salary whether or not he or she took the case. The attorney could also be representing 
himself or herself, which would make the attorney the direct beneficiary of the trial. 
Alternatively, the attorney could be representing a corporation, which would not be viewed in the 
same way as bargaining for other people; this might increase the strength of attorney goal 
manipulation. 
The age manipulation and the gender manipulation also could be strengthened. 
Participants seemed to have paid attention to the gender and the goal of the attorney but not so 
much to the age of the attorney. Perhaps increasing the difference of the ages of the attorneys, for 
instance, describing the attorneys as either a 30-year-old or 65-year-old might make the age 
difference between the two attorneys more dramatic. Additionally, participants could be shown a 
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photo of the attorney in order to trigger the gender and age stereotypes. Unfortunately, a video is 
not likely to be a viable option due to introduction of many nonverbal confounds, as these are 
difficult to control across multiple conditions. However, if it was technically possible to develop 
a recording that is controlled for everything but the pitch of the voice it might also be a good way 
to increase the salience of gender manipulation. 
Finally, in order to examine further the interactions between the characteristics of the 
members of the jury and the lawyer characteristics, it might be beneficial to look at scores on 
ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) within the participant pool to test how that might affect 
perceptions of the attorney, especially of female attorneys. High scores on hostile sexism, or the 
belief that women are inferior to men, would result in female attorneys being perceived as less 
competent within the courtroom, and thus receiving lower scores on the 
persuasiveness/competence scale. On the other hand, a high score on benevolent sexism might 
increase the scores of women on labels such as communion or dominance threat if the subject 
feels intimidated by a female who does not match the stereotypes. In addition to ambivalent 
sexism scales, it might be helpful to examine the scores of the participants on ageism, using a 
scale such as the Fraboni Scale of Ageism (Fraboni, Saltstone & Hughes, 1990). High scores on 
the ageism scale might negatively affect the competence ratings assigned to members of older 
age groups. It might provide insight into how much ageism and sexism affect the participant’s 
ratings of the attorneys, especially on whether these attitudes negatively affect the competence 
and warmth ratings of the attorney. 
    Overall, the findings of this study suggest that our understanding of the biases that 
are possible within juries is far from complete. There are many different components that could 
shape the decision of the jury, and even a simple interaction of the gender of the participant and 
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the characteristics of the attorney can contaminate the jury process. It is evident, that 
“counterbalancing of biases” (Hastie, Penrod & Pennington, 1983) is difficult and given 
limitations in controlling all possible sources of bias it is likely unattainable.  
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Appendix A: Survey items for topic pretest. 
For each of the legal topics, participants answered six questions using a 5-point Likert Scale: 
with endpoints 1 (not at all) to 5 (highly). The topics appeared in a randomized order. 
Following is an example for one of the topics: 
1. Please answer the following questions about homicide as a topic. 
a. How masculine is this topic? 
b. How feminine is this topic? 
c. How interested are you in this topic? 
d. How knowledgeable are you about this topic? 
e. How much do you agree with the statement that most people accused of a crime 
are guilty? 
f. How much do you agree with the statement that most people who file a lawsuit 
are justified in doing so? 
2. Please answer the following questions about battery as a topic. Battery means physical 
contact with intent to harm. 
3. Please answer the following questions about sexual harassment as a topic.  
4. Please answer the following questions about rape as a topic.  
5. Please answer the following questions about tax law as a topic. Tax law includes all laws 
that govern taxation. 
6. Please answer the following questions about contract law as a topic. Contract law governs 
oral and written agreements associated with exchange of goods and services, money, and 
properties. 
7. Please answer the following questions about litigation as a topic. Litigation is any lawsuit. 
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8. Please answer the following questions about property law as a topic. Property law is 
litigation related to land ownership as well objects of ownership such as stocks, money, 
notes, cars etc. 
9. Please answer the following questions about freedom of speech as a topic.  
10. Please answer the following questions about libel and slander as a topic. Slander is making 
a knowingly false spoken statement that causes people to have a bad opinion of someone, 
while libel is the act of publishing such a statement. 
11. Please answer the following questions about civil rights as a topic.  
12. Please answer the following questions about custody as a topic. Custody is the legal right 
to take care of a child. 
13. Please answer the following questions about divorce as a topic.  
14. Please answer the following questions about traffic violations as a topic.  
15. Please answer the following questions about child abuse as a topic.  
16. Please answer the following questions about immigration as a topic.  
17. Please answer the following questions about environmental law as a topic. Environmental 
law refers to laws related to pollution, hazardous waste, wilderness and endangered 
wildlife protection.  
18. Please answer the following questions about labor law as a topic. Labor law refers to the 
rights of employers, employees and labor organizations. 
19. Please answer the following questions about intellectual property as a topic. Intellectual 
property refers to laws that protect the products of human intelligence such as trademarks, 
patents, copyrights and trade secrets. 
20. Please answer the following questions about consumer protection as a topic.  
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21. Please answer the following questions about identity theft as a topic. 
22. Please answer the following questions about robbery as a topic.  
23. Please answer the following questions about police brutality as a topic.  
24. Please answer the following questions about medical malpractice as a topic. Medical 
malpractice relates to instances of negligent, improper or unskilled treatment of a patient 
by a physician, dentist, nurse, pharmacist or other health care provider. 
25. Please answer the following questions about death penalty as a topic.  
26. Please answer the following questions about Not Guilty for Reasons of Insanity as a 
topic.  
27. Please answer the following questions about defendant’s rights as a topic.  Defendant’s 
rights include topics such as a fair trial, illegal search and seizure or Miranda Rights. 
28. Please answer the following questions about inheritance as a topic.  
29. Please answer the following questions about constitutional law as a topic. Constitutional 
law refers to the interpretation and application of the federal and state constitutions. 
30. Please answer the following questions about fraud as a topic.  
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Appendix B: Prescriptive stereotypes of professionals 
Participants rated the following descriptions using a 5-point Likert Scale: with endpoints 1 (not 
at all) to 5 (highly). The descriptions appeared in a randomized order. 
As viewed by the society, how descriptive are the following items of (Older Female 









8. Self- Confident 














22. Aware of feelings of others 
23. Have a desire to avoid controversy 
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Appendix C: Age Approximation 
Participants will give an age approximation of the age of younger and older professionals for 
either female professionals or male professionals. 
1. What do you think is the age of a younger (female/ male) professional? _____ 
2. What do you think is the age of a older (female/ male) professional? _____ 
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Appendix D: Prescriptive stereotypes of professionals 
Participants rated the following descriptions using a 5-point Likert Scale: with endpoints 1 (not 
at all) to 5 (highly). The descriptions appeared in randomized order. 
As viewed by the society, how desirable are the following items of (Older Female Professionals/ 








8. Self- Confident 














22. Aware of feelings of others 
23. Have a desire to avoid controversy 
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Appendix E: Stimuli - Perceived Gender Assessment 
Participants were instructed to listen to the recording available as a hyperlink, and then they 
answered the following questions: 
1. What is the gender of the speaker you just listened to? 
 Male 
 Female 
2. What was the quality of the recording? Did the voice sound natural? Explain ______ 
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Appendix F: Attorney Closing Arguments on Libel 
Eric Jones lived in Springfield, Illinois all his life. He worked two jobs in order to put 
himself through college and then medical school. His dream was to be the Chief of Surgery at 
one of Springfield’s hospitals. In 2012, a spot opened up when the Chief of Surgery decided to 
retire. Eric was a very good candidate, but two days after he announced his candidacy an article 
appeared in the Springfield Gazette discussing a scandal at the hospital. The article discussed a 
surgeon who often operated on patients under the influence of alcohol. The article implicated 
Eric. His reputation was shattered immediately, nurses and fellow doctors questioned his every 
move, patients asked to be cared by other doctors or they chose to go to a different hospital. 
Some patients treated by Eric Jones sued the hospital for endangerment as a result of the article, 
and eventually the Board of Trustees decided the only way to remain profitable is to let Eric go. 
Eric lost everything, his career, his reputation, and his family. He felt alone and betrayed. 
He hired a private investigator, who eventually found a source at the hospital that leaked the 
story about Eric drinking on the job to Springfield Gazette. It was Tom Hilton, his fellow 
colleague and a fellow candidate for the Chief of Surgery. These findings were a slap in the face. 
Eric would have never thought that his friend could spread lies about him. 
Tom Hilton provided the Court with a testimony filled with many gaps, and he failed to 
provide the court with a reason why he went to the press instead of the hospital administration. 
He also failed to explain why it took him so long to report the sightings of Eric’s drunkenness. 
There are no other witnesses that corroborate Tom Hilton’s statements, there is no video footage 
of Eric Jones drinking on the job, and there have been no complaints filed by Eric’s co-workers. 
There is also a clear ulterior motive to Tom’s action as he was a direct beneficiary of the scandal. 
The race for Chief of Surgery was limited to Tom and Eric, and with Eric out of the way, Tom 
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was for sure going to become the Chief of Surgery. The position of Chief of Surgery carries not 
only an increase in social status, but it also has a financial incentive as the job is associated with 
an annual income increase of $25,000. This is not an opportunity that someone gives up without 
a fight, but ideally it should be a fair fight without having to destroy Eric’s reputation based on 
defamation. 
Tom Hilton reached out to the press on his own accord, and he was fully aware that an 
article will be published as a front page story.  The defamation was conducted orally, with full 
knowledge of the fact that it will be published therefore it would classify this act as libel. Tom 
intended for the message to reach a wide audience so he reached out to Springfield Gazette that 
apart from a local in-print distribution, distributes their articles online as well and many of their 
reports have gained national recognition. Eric Jones not only lost his chance at Chief of Surgery, 
he lost his job altogether, and he lost his reputation in Springfield, and since the article is 
available on the Internet, he might never be able to work in the field of medicine. He has clearly 
lost income and he is unlikely to ever be able to earn this income in the future even if he moves 
to a different location, everyone has access to search engines, and there is no way to eliminate all 
traces of the libel. 
We are asking that you charge Tom Hilton with libel, as he was not expressing an 
opinion but a malicious defamation declared as a matter of fact. 
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Appendix G: Attorney Evaluation Scale 
Opinion Measure  
Participants rated the following questions using a 7-point Likert Scale, with endpoints 1 (disagree 
completely) to 7 (agree completely) 
1.  How much do you agree with the attorney, that the defendant was guilty of libel? 
Attorney Evaluation Questionnaire 
Participants rated the following questions using a 7-point Likert Scale, with endpoints1 (not at all) to 
7(highly). The descriptions appeared in a randomized order. 
2. How persuasive was the attorney?  
3. How powerful was the attorney? 
4. How influential was the attorney? 
5. How charismatic was the attorney? 
6. How leader-like was the attorney? 
7. How arrogant was the attorney? 
8. How aggressive was the attorney? 
9. How intimidating was the attorney? 
10. How knowledgeable was the attorney? 
11. How competent was the attorney? 
12. How effective was the attorney? 
13. How confident was the attorney? 
14. How assertive was the attorney? 
15. How likeable was the attorney? 
16. How compassionate was the attorney? 
17. How genuine was the attorney? 
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18. How trustworthy was the attorney? 
19. How sympathetic was the attorney? 
Message Evaluation Questionnaire 
Participants rated the following questions using a 7-point Likert Scale, with endpoints1 (not at all) to 
7(highly). The descriptions appeared in a randomized order. 
20. How compelling was the attorney’s message? 
21. How through was the attorney’s message? 
22. How clear was the attorney’s message? 
23. How logical was the attorney’s message? 
24. How emotional was the attorney’s message? 
25. How passionate was the attorney’s message? 
26. How dry was the attorney’s message? 
27. How boring was the attorney’s message? 
Manipulation Check Questionnaire 
Participants answered the following questions in a randomized order. 
28. Whom was the attorney representing? 
a. The person who accused someone of libel 
b. The person accused of libel 
29. What was the gender of the attorney? 
a. Female 
b. Male 
30. What was the age of the attorney? 
a. __________ 
31. Will the attorney be paid if the case is won? 
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Appendix H: Attorney Biographical Note 
On the following screen, you will read closing arguments made by (Christopher/ Christine Johnson) an 
attorney with Carter and Johnson, LLP. (He/She) is a (30/55)-year-old attorney from Illinois. (He/She) is 
representing the plaintiff, Eric Jones, [pro bono, meaning that the (he/she) is not being compensated for 
representing the client/ on contingency, meaning that the (he/she) would be compensated with a 
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Table 1 
Results of a Paired Sample T-Test Analyses for Masculinity and Femininity of Topics 
for Pretest 1 








Topic N M  SD 
 
M  SD 
 
t (70)   p 




10.35a .00  




8.38a .00  




-0.66a .51  




-1.73 .09  




5.04a .00  




6.10 .00  




3.18 .00  




4.63a .00  




0.31 .76  




-1.40 .17  




-0.23 .82  




-5.02a .00  




-3.08 .00  




1.37 .18  




1.05 .30  




-2.50a .02  




5.04 .00  




4.54a .00  




-1.49 .14  




3.13b .00  




11.47 .00  




11.83 .00  




3.09 .00  




9.88a .00  




2.41 .02  




1.52 .13  




2.36 .02  




4.18a .00  




4.64 .00  
Traffic Violations 71 2.68 0.97   2.79 1.07   -0.92 .36  
Note. Masculinity and Femininity of the topic were rated on a 5-poin Likert scale. For 
degrees of freedom: a=69, b=68. 
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Table 2 
Results of Independent Sample T-test Analyses of Pretest 1 on the Interest in the Topic Based on the 







Topic N M  SD 
 
N M  SD 
 
t(69)   p 
Homicide 32 2.72 1.20 
 
38 2.68 0.96 
 
0.13a .89  
Battery 32 2.25 1.16 
 
39 2.36 0.84 
 
0.92e .36  
Sexual Harassment 32 3.16 1.25 
 
39 2.36 1.16 
 
2.79 .01  
Rape 32 3.22 1.36 
 
39 2.21 0.95 
 
3.56d .00  
Tax Law 32 2.22 1.29 
 
39 2.36 1.39 
 
-0.44 .66  
Contract Law 32 2.16 1.14 
 
39 2.10 1.17 
 
0.20 .85  
Litigation 32 2.47 1.19 
 
39 2.26 1.16 
 
0.76 .45  
Property Law 31 2.06 1.00 
 
38 2.34 1.19 
 
-1.03b .31  
Freedom of Speech 32 3.34 1.38 
 
39 3.90 1.10 
 
-1.84c .07  
Libel and Slander 32 2.50 1.08 
 
39 2.38 0.96 
 
0.48 .64  
Civil Rights 30 3.33 1.24 
 
39 3.08 1.29 
 
0.83b .41  
Custody 32 2.69 1.26 
 
39 2.21 1.11 
 
1.72 .09  
Divorce 32 2.53 1.16 
 
39 2.18 1.05 
 
1.34 .19  
Child Abuse 32 3.16 1.32 
 
38 2.61 1.13 
 
1.88a .06  
Immigration 32 2.97 1.15 
 
39 3.03 1.43 
 
-0.18 .86  
Environmental Law 32 2.94 1.37 
 
38 2.92 1.36 
 
0.05a .96  
Labor Law 32 2.56 1.27 
 
39 3.03 1.20 
 
-1.58 .12  
Intellectual Property 32 2.41 1.34 
 
39 3.23 1.20 
 
-2.73 .01  
Consumer Protection 32 3.03 1.31 
 
39 2.85 1.14 
 
0.64 .53  
Identity Theft 32 2.81 1.12 
 
39 3.00 1.10 
 
-0.71 .48  
Robbery 32 2.53 1.22 
 
39 2.67 0.96 
 
-0.53 .60  
Police Brutality 32 2.72 1.09 
 
39 2.97 1.14 
 
-0.96 .34  
Medical Malpractice 32 2.78 1.24 
 
39 2.64 1.09 
 
0.51 .61  
Death Penalty 32 3.16 1.25 
 
39 3.00 1.15 
 
0.55 .59  
Not Guilty for Reasons of Insanity 32 2.91 1.28 
 
39 2.90 1.17 
 
0.03 .98  
Defendant’s Rights 32 2.94 1.11 
 
39 3.31 1.32 
 
-1.26 .21  
Inheritance 32 2.63 1.29 
 
39 2.67 1.31 
 
-0.14 .89  
Constitutional Law 32 2.31 1.31 
 
39 2.92 1.27 
 
-2.00 .05  
Fraud 31 2.39 1.17 
 
39 2.82 1.02 
 
-1.65a .10  
Traffic Violations 32 2.19 1.18   39 2.36 1.16   -0.62 .74  
Note. Interest was rated on a 5-poin Likert scale, 1 = not at all and 5 = highly.  For degrees of freedom: 
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Table 3 
Results of  Independent Sample t-test Analyses of Pretest 1  on the Knowledge of the Topic 







Topic N M  SD 
 
N M  SD 
 
t(69)   p 
Homicide 32 2.41 0.76 
 
39 2.92 0.96 
 
-2.48 .02 
Battery 31 2.19 0.83 
 
39 2.36 0.84 
 
-0.82a .42 
Sexual Harassment 32 3.19 1.03 
 
38 2.61 1.03 
 
2.36 a .02 
Rape 32 3.00 1.11 
 
39 2.72 0.97 
 
1.14 .26 
Tax Law 32 1.88 1.01 
 
39 2.26 1.14 
 
-1.48 .14 
Contract Law 32 2.00 1.11 
 
39 1.92 1.04 
 
0.30 .76 
Litigation 32 2.03 0.90 
 
39 2.18 0.97 
 
-0.66 .51 
Property Law 31 1.74 0.86 
 
39 2.08 1.09 
 
-1.41 a .16 
Freedom of Speech 32 3.22 1.07 
 
39 3.38 1.02 
 
-0.67 .51 
Libel and Slander 32 2.31 0.93 
 
39 2.38 1.14 
 
-0.29 .77 
Civil Rights 32 2.91 1.03 
 
39 2.79 1.06 
 
0.45 .66 
Custody 32 2.69 1.26 
 
38 2.26 0.98 
 
1.59 a .12 
Divorce 32 3.09 1.17 
 
39 2.62 1.02 
 
1.84 .07 
Child Abuse 32 2.75 1.14 
 
39 2.69 1.06 
 
0.22 .83 
Immigration 31 2.65 0.99 
 
39 3.03 1.09 
 
-1.52 a .13 
Environmental Law 32 2.25 1.11 
 
39 2.69 1.22 
 
-1.59 .12 
Labor Law 32 2.06 1.01 
 
39 2.49 1.07 
 
-1.70 .09 
Intellectual Property 31 1.97 0.88 
 
39 2.38 1.04 
 
-1.78 a .08 
Consumer Protection 32 2.28 0.96 
 
38 2.42 0.98 
 
-0.60 a .55 
Identity Theft 31 2.48 1.06 
 
39 2.77 1.04 
 
-1.13 a .26 
Robbery 32 2.47 1.05 
 
39 2.74 0.99 
 
-1.13 .26 
Police Brutality 32 2.44 0.91 
 
39 2.82 0.91 
 
-1.76 .08 
Medical Malpractice 32 2.16 0.85 
 
39 2.23 0.99 
 
-0.34 .74 
Death Penalty 31 2.74 1.26 
 
39 2.82 1.05 
 
-0.28 a .78 
Not Guilty for Reasons of 
Insanity 
32 2.38 1.13 
 
39 2.33 0.98 
 
0.17 .87 
Defendant’s Rights 32 2.47 0.88 
 
39 2.82 1.07 
 
-1.49 .14 
Inheritance 32 2.16 0.99 
 
39 2.41 0.97 
 
-1.09 .28 
Constitutional Law 32 1.94 1.05 
 
39 2.28 0.92 
 
-1.48 .14 
Fraud 32 2.19 0.90 
 
39 2.64 0.99 
 
-2.01 .05 
Traffic Violations 32 2.53 1.05   39 3.05 1.03   -2.11 .04 
Note. Knowledge of the topic were rated on a 5-poin Likert scale, 1 = not at all and 5 = highly. For 
degrees of freedom: a=68. 
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Table 4 
Results of Independent Sample T-test Analyses of Pretest 1 on the Presumed Guilt Based on the 







Topic N M  SD   N M  SD   t   p 
Homicide 32 2.97 1.06 
 
39 2.90 1.29 
 
0.25 .80 
Battery 32 3.22 1.07 
 
39 2.62 1.18 
 
2.23 .03 
Sexual Harassment 32 3.09 1.09 
 
39 2.59 1.21 
 
1.83 .07 
Rape 32 3.16 1.14 
 
39 2.79 1.22 
 
1.28 .21 
Tax Law 32 2.88 1.01 
 
39 2.62 1.09 
 
1.03 .31 
Contract Law 32 2.78 0.87 
 
39 2.44 1.02 
 
1.52 .13 
Litigation 32 2.81 0.97 
 
39 2.44 1.05 
 
1.56 .12 
Property Law 31 2.87 1.02 
 
39 2.62 1.07 
 
1.01a .31 
Freedom of Speech 32 2.75 1.05 
 
39 2.38 1.04 
 
1.47 .15 
Libel and Slander 32 2.94 1.11 
 
39 2.46 1.10 
 
1.81 .07 
Civil Rights 30 3.00 1.08 
 
39 2.46 1.10 
 
2.03b .05 
Custody 32 2.88 1.04 
 
39 2.51 1.02 
 
1.47 .15 
Divorce 32 2.91 1.09 
 
39 2.36 1.06 
 
2.14 .04 
Child Abuse 32 3.09 0.21 
 
39 2.97 1.31 
 
0.40 .69 
Immigration 32 3.00 1.11 
 
39 2.67 1.20 
 
1.21 .23 
Environmental Law 32 2.91 1.15 
 
39 2.62 1.09 
 
1.09 .28 
Labor Law 32 3.03 1.03 
 
38 2.58 1.13 
 
1.74a .09 
Intellectual Property 32 2.91 1.12 
 
39 2.56 1.01 
 
1.30 .20 
Consumer Protection 32 3.03 1.15 
 
39 2.69 1.13 
 
1.25 .22 
Identity Theft 32 3.22 1.13 
 
39 2.82 1.30 
 
1.38 .18 
Robbery 32 3.13 1.10 
 
39 2.87 1.26 
 
0.89 .38 
Police Brutality 32 3.06 1.08 
 
39 2.72 1.28 
 
1.21 .23 
Medical Malpractice 32 2.88 1.13 
 
39 2.49 1.17 
 
1.41 .16 
Death Penalty 32 2.94 1.22 
 
39 2.82 1.25 
 
0.40 .69 
Not Guilty for Reasons of Insanity 32 2.81 1.03 
 
39 2.59 1.14 
 
0.86 .40 
Defendant’s Rights 32 2.88 0.98 
 
39 2.56 0.97 
 
1.34 .18 
Inheritance 32 2.66 0.97 
 
39 2.56 1.19 
 
0.35 .73 
Constitutional Law 32 2.78 1.01 
 
39 2.51 1.12 
 
1.05 .30 
Fraud 31 3.23 1.09 
 
39 2.85 1.29 
 
1.31a .19 
Traffic Violations 32 3.06 1.13   39 2.77 1.18   1.06 .29 
Note. Presumed Guilt based on the topic was rated on a 5-poin Likert scale, 1 = not at all and 5 
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Table 5 
Results of Independent Sample t-test Analyses of Pretest 1on the Lawsuit Justification of the 







Topic N M  SD 
 
N M  SD 
 
t(69)   p 
Homicide 31 2.74 1.00 






Battery 32 2.03 1.06 
 
39 2.74 0.99 
 
1.18 .24 
Sexual Harassment 32 3.00 1.10 
 
39 2.51 1.07 
 
1.95 .06 
Rape 32 3.09 1.09 
 
39 2.92 1.13 
 
0.64 .52 
Tax Law 32 2.59 0.91 
 
39 2.56 0.85 
 
0.14 .89 
Contract Law 32 2.81 0.82 
 
39 2.62 0.94 
 
0.93 .35 
Litigation 32 2.66 0.87 
 
39 2.38 0.94 
 
1.26 .21 
Property Law 30 2.63 0.89 
 





Freedom of Speech 32 2.88 0.91 
 
39 2.59 1.02 
 
1.23 .22 
Libel and Slander 32 2.81 0.97 
 
39 2.46 1.02 
 
1.48 .14 
Civil Rights 32 3.00 1.14 
 
39 2.46 0.91 
 
2.22 .03 
Custody 32 2.66 0.90 
 
39 2.49 1.00 
 
0.74 .46 
Divorce 32 2.75 0.80 
 
39 2.46 0.97 
 
1.35 .18 
Child Abuse 32 2.88 1.01 
 
39 2.92 1.16 
 
-0.19 .85 
Immigration 32 2.53 0.88 
 
39 2.38 0.96 
 
0.66 .51 
Environmental Law 32 2.88 1.04 
 
39 2.64 1.04 
 
0.94 .35 
Labor Law 32 2.94 1.01 
 
39 2.64 1.01 
 
1.23 .22 
Intellectual Property 32 2.72 0.99 
 
39 2.69 1.03 
 
0.11 .91 
Consumer Protection 32 2.94 1.11 
 
39 2.59 0.88 
 
1.48 .14 
Identity Theft 32 3.06 1.11 
 
39 2.82 1.12 
 
0.91 .37 
Robbery 32 2.88 0.98 
 
39 2.79 1.11 
 
0.32 .75 
Police Brutality 31 3.03 1.17 
 





Medical Malpractice 32 2.84 1.05 
 
39 2.72 1.21 
 
0.46 .65 
Death Penalty 32 2.69 0.97 
 
39 2.67 1.01 
 
0.09 .93 
Not Guilty for Reasons 
of Insanity 
32 2.66 0.87 
 
39 2.46 0.91 
 
0.92 .36 
Defendant’s Rights 32 2.84 0.88 
 
39 2.77 0.96 
 
0.34 .74 
Inheritance 32 2.63 0.87 
 
39 2.36 0.93 
 
1.23 .22 
Constitutional Law 32 2.69 0.93 
 
39 2.64 0.96 
 
0.21 .84 
Fraud 32 3.03 1.03 
 
39 2.95 1.05 
 
0.33 .74 
Traffic Violations 32 2.72 0.89   39 2.64 1.01   0.34 .74 
Note. Lawsuit Justification of the topic were rated on a 5-poin Likert scale, 1 = not at all and 5 = 
highly. For degrees of freedom a= 68, b= 67. 
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Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviations for 2 (Participant Gender) X 2 ( Professional Age) X 2 
(Professional Gender) ANOVA on the Descriptive Stereotypes of Competence 
Experimental Condition 
Female    Male    Total Participants  
N M  SD   N M  SD   N M  SD 
Younger Professional 
           
 
Female Professional 25 3.65 0.62 
 
41 3.61 0.70 
 
66 3.62 0.67 
 
Male Professional 28 3.72 0.69 
 
43 3.75 0.55 
 
71 3.74 0.60 
 
Total Professional Gender 53 3.69 0.65 
 
84 3.68 0.63 
 
137 3.68 0.64 
Older Professional 
           
 
Female Professional 32 4.01 0.61 
 
37 3.73 0.64 
 
69 3.86 0.64 
 
Male Professional 30 4.07 0.52 
 
38 4.03 0.40 
 
68 4.05 0.45 
 
Total Professional Gender 62 4.04 0.56 
 
75 3.88 0.55 
 
137 3.95 0.56 
Total  Professional Age 
           
 
Female Professional 57 3.85 0.63 
 
78 3.66 0.67 
 
135 3.74 0.66 
 
Male Professional 58 3.90 0.63 
 
81 3.88 0.50 
 
139 3.89 0.56 
  Total Professional Gender 115 3.88 0.63   159 3.78 0.60   274 3.82 0.61 
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations for 2 (Participant Gender) X 2 (Professional Age) X 2 
(Professional Gender) ANOVA on the  Descriptive Stereotype of Warmth 
Experimental Condition 
Female    Male    Total Participants  
N M  SD   N M  SD   N M  SD 
Younger Professional 
           
 
Female Professional 25 3.61 0.63 
 
41 3.45 0.64 
 
66 3.51 0.64 
 
Male Professional 28 2.93 0.69 
 
43 3.04 0.46 
 
71 3.00 0.56 
 
Total Professional Gender 53 3.25 0.74 
 
84 3.24 0.59 
 
137 3.24 0.65 
Older Professional 
           
 
Female Professional 32 3.50 0.68 
 
37 3.41 0.73 
 
69 3.45 0.70 
 
Male Professional 30 2.55 0.57 
 
38 3.19 0.61 
 
68 2.91 0.67 
 
Total Professional Gender 62 3.04 0.79 
 
75 3.30 0.68 
 
137 3.18 0.74 
Total  Professional Age 
           
 
Female Professional 57 3.55 0.65 
 
78 3.43 0.68 
 
135 3.48 0.67 
 
Male Professional 58 2.73 0.65 
 
81 3.11 0.54 
 
139 2.95 0.62 
  Total Professional Gender 115 3.14 0.77   159 3.27 0.63   274 3.21 0.69 
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Table 8 
Means and Standard Deviations for 2(Participant Gender) X 2( Professional Age) X 2 
(Professional Gender) ANOVA on the  Prescriptive Stereotype of Competence for Pretest 4 
Experimental Condition 
Female    Male    Total Participant  
N M SD 
 
N M SD 
 
N M SD 
Younger Professional       
 






Female Professional 30 4.09 0.68 
 
26 4.06 0.61 
 
56 4.07 0.64 
 
Male Professional 41 3.90 0.70 
 
45 4.30 0.51 
 




71 3.98 0.69 
 
71 4.21 0.56 
 
142 4.09 0.64 
Older Professional 
           
 
Female Professional 25 4.17 0.52 
 
37 4.02 0.61 
 
62 4.08 0.58 
 
Male Professional 46 3.99 0.64 
 
34 4.10 0.62 
 




71 4.06 0.60 
 
71 4.06 0.61 
 
142 4.06 0.61 
Total  Professional Age 
           
 
Female Professional 55 4.12 0.61 
 
63 4.03 0.61 
 
118 4.08 0.61 
 
Male Professional 87 3.99 0.67 
 
79 4.21 0.57 
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Table 9 
Means and Standard Deviations for 2 (Participant Gender) X 2 (Professional Age) X 2 
(Professional Gender) ANOVA on the Prescriptive Stereotype of Warmth for Pretest 4 
Experimental Condition 
Female    Male   Total Participants  
N M SD 
 
N M SD 
 
N M SD 
Younger Professional       
 
      
 
      
 
Female Professional 30 3.75 0.68 
 
26 3.69 0.74 
 
56 3.72 0.70 
 
Male Professional 41 3.82 0.60 
 
45 3.68 0.75 
 
86 3.75 0.69 
 
Total Professional Gender 71 3.79 0.63 
 
71 3.68 0.74 
 
142 3.74 0.69 
Older Professional 
           
 
Female Professional 25 3.64 0.75 
 
37 3.51 0.74 
 
62 3.56 0.74 
 
Male Professional 46 3.71 0.81 
 
34 3.74 0.61 
 
80 3.72 0.74 
 
Total Professional Gender 71 3.69 0.79 
 
71 3.68 0.69 
 
142 3.65 0.74 
Total  Professional Age 
           
 
Female Professional 55 3.69 0.71 
 
63 3.59 0.74 
 
118 3.64 0.72 
 
Male Professional 87 3.76 0.72 
 
79 3.70 0.69 
 
166 3.74 0.70 
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Table 10 
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis With Varimax Rotation of Attorney 
Evaluation Items 
Descriptions of Attorney 
Persuasiveness-
Competence 
Communion Dominance Threat 
Persuasive .72 .15 -.01 
Powerful .52 .29 .33 
Influential .69 .17 .10 
Charismatic .32 .46 .21 
Leader-like .60 .34 .23 
Arrogant -.27 -.18 .60 
Aggressive .33 .00 .48 
Intimidating .08 .05 .59 
Knowledgeable .70 .32 -.02 
Competent .77 .23 -.01 
Effective .78 .22 -.04 
Confident .75 .22 .03 
Assertive .64 .18 .23 
Likable .35 .63 -.04 
Compassionate .11 .78 -.01 
Genuine .48 .57 -.11 
Trustworthy .43 .59 -.03 
Sympathetic .06 .63 -.01 
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Table 11 
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis With Varimax Rotation of Message 
Evaluation Items 






Compelling .65 .23 -.15 
Thorough .68 .28 -.15 
Clear .78 .11 -.19 
Logical .77 .07 -.23 
Emotional .10 .50 -.07 
Passionate .21 .85 -.16 
Dry -.13 -.20 .72 
Boring -.35 -.05 .69 
Note. Factor Loadings > .40 are in boldface. 
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Table 12 
Means and Standard Deviations for 2 (Participant's Gender) X 2 (Attorney Gender) X 2 






Total Participant  
N M  SD 
 
N M SD 
 
N M  SD 
Female Attorney 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 28 5.86 1.12 
 
37 5.97 0.87 
 
65 5.92 0.98 
  
Communal Goal 38 6.18 0.97 
 
35 5.96 0.94 
 
73 6.07 0.96 
  
Total Goal 66 6.04 1.04 
 
72 5.97 0.90 
 
138 6.00 0.97 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 28 6.11 0.63 
 
38 6.14 0.70 
 
66 6.13 0.67 
  
Communal Goal 22 6.10 0.76 
 
36 6.13 0.83 
 
58 6.12 0.80 
  
Total Goal 50 6.11 0.69 
 
74 6.13 0.76 
 
124 6.12 0.73 
 
Total  Attorney Age 
           
  
Agentic Goal 56 5.98 0.91 
 
75 6.06 0.79 
 
131 6.03 0.84 
  
Communal Goal 60 6.15 0.89 
 
71  6.04 0.88 
 
131 6.09 0.89 
  
Total Goal 116 6.07 0.90 
 
146 6.05 0.83 
 
262 6.06 0.86 
Male Attorney 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 14 6.46 0.58 
 
44 5.91 0.98 
 
58 6.04 0.93 
  
Communal Goal 28 6.30 0.73 
 
38 5.92 0.82 
 
66 6.08 0.80 
  
Total Goal 42 6.36 0.68 
 
82 5.91 0.91 
 
124 6.06 0.86 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 26 5.99 1.14 
 
40 6.09 0.75 
 
66 6.05 0.92 
  
Communal Goal 22 6.04 0.53 
 
48 5.72 1.11 
 
70 5.82 0.97 
  
Total Goal 48 6.01 0.91 
 
88 5.89 0.98 
 
136 5.93 0.95 
 
Total Attorney Age 
           
  
Agentic Goal 40 6.16 1.00 
 
84 5.99 0.88 
 
124 6.05 0.92 
  
Communal Goal 50 6.19 0.66 
 
86 5.81 0.99 
 
136 5.95 0.90 
  
Total Goal 90 6.17 0.82 
 
170 5.90 0.94 
 
260 5.99 0.91 
Total Attorney Gender 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 42 6.06 1.01 
 
81 5.94 0.93 
 
123 5.98 0.95 
  
Communal Goal 66 6.23 0.87 
 
73 5.94 0.87 
 
139 6.08 0.88 
  
Total Goal 108 6.16 0.93 
 
154 5.94 0.90 
 
262 6.03 0.92 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 54 6.05 0.91 
 
78 6.11 0.72 
 
132 6.09 0.80 
  
Communal Goal 44 6.07 0.65 
 
84 5.89 1.01 
 
128 5.95 0.91 
  
Total Goal 98 6.06 0.80 
 
162 6.00 0.89 
 
260 6.02 0.85 
 
Total  Attorney Age 
          
  
Agentic Goal 96 6.06 0.95 
 
159 6.02 0.84 
 
255 6.04 0.88 
  
Communal Goal 110 6.17 0.79 
 
157 5.91 0.95 
 
267 6.02 0.89 
    Total Goal 206 6.12 0.87   316 5.97 0.89   522 6.03 0.89 
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Table 13 
Means and Standard Deviations for 2 (Participant's Gender)X 2 (Attorney Gender) X 2 (Attorney 






Total Participant  
N M  SD 
 
N M SD 
 
N M  SD 
Female Attorney 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 28 4.89 1.38 
 
37 5.12 0.97 
 
65 5.02 1.16 
  
Communal Goal 38 5.11 0.95 
 
35 4.69 1.09 
 
73 4.90 1.03 
  
Total Goal 66 5.02 1.15 
 
72 4.91 1.04 
 
138 4.96 1.09 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 28 4.98 1.10 
 
38 5.21 0.98 
 
66 5.11 1.03 
  
Communal Goal 22 5.25 1.27 
 
36 5.03 1.22 
 
58 5.11 1.23 
  
Total Goal 50 5.10 1.17 
 
74 5.12 1.10 
 
124 5.11 1.13 
 
Total  Attorney Age 
           
  
Agentic Goal 56 4.94 1.24 
 
75 5.17 0.97 
 
131 5.07 1.09 
  
Communal Goal 60 5.16 1.07 
 
71 4.86 1.16 
 
131 5.00 1.13 
  
Total Goal 116 5.05 1.15 
 
146 5.02 1.07 
 
262 5.03 1.11 
Male Attorney 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 14 5.14 1.13 
 
44 5.00 1.15 
 
58 5.03 1.14 
  
Communal Goal 28 4.88 1.10 
 
38 4.91 1.12 
 
66 4.89 1.10 
  
Total Goal 42 4.96 1.11 
 
82 4.96 1.13 
 
124 4.96 1.12 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 26 4.50 1.39 
 
40 4.85 1.07 
 
66 4.71 1.21 
  
Communal Goal 22 5.43 0.94 
 
48 5.00 1.25 
 
70 5.14 1.17 
  
Total Goal 48 4.93 1.28 
 
88 4.93 1.17 
 
136 4.93 1.20 
 
Total Attorney Age 
           
  
Agentic Goal 40 4.73 1.33 
 
84 4.93 1.11 
 
124 4.86 1.18 
  
Communal Goal 50 5.12 1.06 
 
86 4.96 1.19 
 
136 5.02 1.14 
  
Total Goal 90 4.94 1.20 
 
170 4.94 1.15 
 
260 4.94 1.16 
Total Attorney Gender 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 42 4.98 1.29 
 
81 5.06 1.07 
 
123 5.03 1.14 
  
Communal Goal 66 5.01 1.02 
 
73 4.80 1.10 
 
139 4.90 1.06 
  
Total Goal 108 5.00 1.13 
 
154 4.94 1.09 
 
262 4.96 1.10 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 54 4.75 1.26 
 
78 5.03 1.04 
 
132 4.91 1.14 
  
Communal Goal 44 5.34 1.11 
 
84 5.01 1.23 
 
128 5.13 1.19 
  
Total Goal 98 5.02 1.22 
 
162 5.02 1.14 
 
260 5.02 1.17 
 
Total  Attorney Age 
          
  
Agentic Goal 96 4.85 1.27 
 
159 5.04 1.05 
 
255 4.97 1.14 
  
Communal Goal 110 5.14 1.06 
 
157 4.91 1.17 
 
267 5.01 1.13 
    Total Goal 206 5.00 1.17   316 4.98 1.11   522 4.99 1.13 
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Table 14 
Means and Standard Deviations for 2 (Participant's Gender) X 2 (Attorney Gender) X 2 






Total Participant  
N M  SD 
 
N M SD 
 
N M  SD 
Female Attorney 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 28 3.32 1.58 
 
37 3.27 1.17 
 
65 3.29 1.35 
  
Communal Goal 38 3.00 1.39 
 
35 2.90 1.05 
 
73 2.95 1.23 
  
Total Goal 66 3.14 1.47 
 
72 3.09 1.12 
 
138 3.11 1.29 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 28 2.41 1.11 
 
38 2.97 1.13 
 
66 2.73 1.14 
  
Communal Goal 22 2.36 1.36 
 
36 2.63 1.27 
 
58 2.53 1.30 
  
Total Goal 50 2.39 1.21 
 
74 2.80 1.20 
 
124 2.64 1.22 
 
Total  Attorney Age 
           
  
Agentic Goal 56 4.94 1.24 
 
75 3.12 1.15 
 
131 3.01 1.28 
  
Communal Goal 60 5.16 1.07 
 
71 2.76 1.16 
 
131 2.76 1.27 
  
Total Goal 116 5.05 1.15 
 
146 2.95 1.17 
 
262 2.89 1.28 
Male Attorney 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 14 2.32 1.17 
 
44 3.02 1.23 
 
58 2.85 1.25 
  
Communal Goal 28 2.77 1.40 
 
38 3.28 1.38 
 
66 3.06 1.40 
  
Total Goal 42 2.62 1.33 
 
82 3.14 1.30 
 
124 2.96 1.33 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 26 3.02 1.57 
 
40 3.38 1.36 
 
66 3.23 1.44 
  
Communal Goal 22 2.66 1.24 
 
48 2.99 1.12 
 
70 2.89 1.16 
  
Total Goal 48 2.85 1.42 
 
88 3.16 1.24 
 
136 3.06 1.31 
 
Total Attorney Age 
           
  
Agentic Goal 40 2.78 1.46 
 
84 3.19 1.30 
 
124 3.06 1.36 
  
Communal Goal 50 2.72 1.32 
 
86 3.12 1.24 
 
136 2.97 1.28 
  
Total Goal 90 2.74 1.38 
 
170 3.15 1.27 
 
260 3.01 1.32 
Total Attorney Gender 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 42 2.99 1.52 
 
81 3.14 1.20 
 
123 3.09 1.31 
  
Communal Goal 66 2.90 1.39 
 
73 3.10 1.24 
 
139 3.00 1.31 
  
Total Goal 108 2.94 1.43 
 
154 3.12 1.22 
 
262 3.04 1.31 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 54 2.70 1.37 
 
78 3.18 1.26 
 
132 2.98 1.32 
  
Communal Goal 44 2.51 1.30 
 
84 2.83 1.19 
 
128 2.72 1.23 
  
Total Goal 98 2.62 1.33 
 
162 3.00 1.23 
 
260 2.86 1.28 
 
Total  Attorney Age 
          
  
Agentic Goal 96 2.83 1.43 
 
159 3.16 1.23 
 
255 3.03 1.32 
  
Communal Goal 110 2.75 1.36 
 
157 2.96 1.22 
 
267 2.87 1.28 
    Total Goal 206 2.78 1.39   316 3.06 1.22   522 2.95 1.30 
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Table 15 
Means and Standard Deviations for 2 (Participant's Gender) X 2 (Attorney Gender) X 






Total Participant  
Experimental Condition N M SD 
 
N M SD 
 
N M SD 
Female Attorney 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 28 5.66 0.95 
 
37 5.69 0.84 
 
65 5.68 0.88 
  
Communal Goal 38 5.97 0.78 
 
35 5.70 0.74 
 
73 5.84 0.76 
  
Total Goal 66 5.84 0.86 
 
72 5.70 0.78 
 
138 5.76 0.82 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 28 5.80 0.68 
 
38 5.87 0.71 
 
66 5.84 0.69 
  
Communal Goal 22 5.78 0.92 
 
36 5.90 0.71 
 
58 5.85 0.79 
  
Total Goal 50 5.79 0.79 
 
74 5.88 0.70 
 
124 5.85 0.74 
 
Total  Attorney Age 
          
  
Agentic Goal 56 5.73 0.83 
 
75 5.78 0.77 
 
131 5.76 0.79 
  
Communal Goal 60 5.90 0.83 
 
71 5.80 0.73 
 
131 5.84 0.77 
  
Total Goal 116 5.82 0.83 
 
146 5.79 0.75 
 
262 5.80 0.78 
Male Attorney 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 14 6.25 0.56 
 
44 5.62 1.00 
 
58 5.77 0.95 
  
Communal Goal 28 6.12 0.64 
 
38 5.55 0.92 
 
66 5.79 0.86 
  
Total Goal 42 6.16 0.61 
 
82 5.59 0.96 
 
124 5.78 0.90 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 26 5.86 1.07 
 
40 5.76 0.70 
 
66 5.80 0.86 
  
Communal Goal 22 6.02 0.64 
 
48 5.59 0.94 
 
70 5.73 0.88 
  
Total Goal 48 5.94 0.90 
 
88 5.67 0.84 
 
136 5.76 0.87 
 
Total Attorney Age 
           
  
Agentic Goal 40 6.00 0.94 
 
84 5.69 0.87 
 
66 5.80 0.86 
  
Communal Goal 50 6.08 0.64 
 
86 5.57 0.93 
 
70 5.73 0.88 
  
Total Goal 90 6.04 0.78 
 
170 5.63 0.90 
 
136 5.76 0.87 
Total Attorney Gender 
          
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 42 5.86 0.88 
 
81 5.65 0.93 
 
123 5.72 0.91 
  
Communal Goal 66 6.03 0.72 
 
73 5.62 0.84 
 
139 5.82 0.81 
  
Total Goal 108 5.96 0.79 
 
154 5.64 0.88 
 
262 5.77 0.86 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 54 5.83 0.88 
 
78 5.81 0.70 
 
132 5.82 0.78 
  
Communal Goal 44 5.90 0.80 
 
84 5.72 0.86 
 
128 5.78 0.84 
  
Total Goal 98 5.86 0.84 
 
162 5.76 0.79 
 
260 5.80 0.81 
 
Total  Attorney Age 
          
  
Agentic Goal 96 5.84 0.88 
 
159 5.73 0.82 
 
255 5.77 0.85 
  
Communal Goal 110 5.98 0.75 
 
157 5.68 0.85 
 
267 5.80 0.82 
    Total Goal 206 5.91 0.81   316 5.70 0.83   522 5.79 0.83 
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Table 16 
Means and Standard Deviations for 2 (Participant's Gender) X 2 (Attorney Gender) X 2 (Attorney 







Total Participant  
N M  SD  N M  SD  N M  SD 
Female Attorney 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 28 5.29 0.96 
 
37 5.08 0.87 
 
65 5.17 0.91 
  
Communal Goal 38 5.25 0.94 
 
35 4.93 0.87 
 
73 5.09 0.92 
  
Total Goal 66 5.27 0.94 
 
72 5.00 0.87 
 
138 5.13 0.91 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 28 5.20 0.79 
 
38 5.08 0.81 
 
66 5.13 0.80 
  
Communal Goal 22 5.14 0.87 
 
36 5.20 1.00 
 
58 5.18 0.95 
  
Total Goal 50 5.18 0.82 
 
74 5.14 0.91 
 
124 5.15 0.87 
 
Total  Attorney Age 
          
  
Agentic Goal 56 5.25 0.87 
 
75 5.08 0.84 
 
131 5.15 0.85 
  
Communal Goal 60 5.21 0.91 
 
71 5.06 0.94 
 
131 5.13 0.93 
  
Total Goal 116 5.23 0.89 
 
146 5.07 0.89 
 
262 5.14 0.89 
Male Attorney 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 14 5.53 1.11 
 
44 4.88 0.84 
 
58 5.04 0.94 
  
Communal Goal 28 5.58 0.84 
 
38 5.03 0.84 
 
66 5.26 0.87 
  
Total Goal 42 5.56 0.92 
 
82 4.95 0.84 
 
124 5.16 0.91 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 26 5.21 0.91 
 
40 4.95 1.11 
 
66 5.05 1.04 
  
Communal Goal 22 5.23 0.87 
 
48 4.90 1.07 
 
70 5.01 1.02 
  
Total Goal 48 5.22 0.88 
 
88 4.93 1.08 
 
136 5.03 1.02 
 
Total Attorney Age 
           
  
Agentic Goal 40 5.32 0.98 
 
84 4.91 0.97 
 
124 5.05 0.99 
  
Communal Goal 50 5.43 0.86 
 
86 4.96 0.97 
 
136 5.13 0.96 
  
Total Goal 90 5.38 0.91 
 
170 4.94 0.97 
 
260 5.09 0.97 
Total Attorney Gender 
          
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 42 5.37 1.00 
 
81 4.97 0.85 
 
123 5.11 0.92 
  
Communal Goal 66 5.39 0.91 
 
73 4.98 0.85 
 
139 5.17 0.90 
  
Total Goal 108 5.38 0.94 
 
154 4.97 0.85 
 
262 5.14 0.91 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 54 5.20 0.84 
 
78 5.02 0.97 
 
132 5.09 0.92 
  
Communal Goal 44 5.19 0.86 
 
84 5.03 1.05 
 
128 5.08 0.99 
  
Total Goal 98 5.20 0.85 
 
162 5.02 1.01 
 
260 5.09 0.95 
 
Total  Attorney Age 
          
  
Agentic Goal 96 5.28 0.92 
 
159 4.99 0.91 
 
255 5.10 0.92 
  
Communal Goal 110 5.31 0.89 
 
157 5.01 0.96 
 
267 5.13 0.94 
    Total Goal 206 5.29 0.90   316 5.00 0.93   522 5.12 0.93 
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Table 17 
Means and Standard Deviations for 2 (Participant's Gender) X 2 (Attorney Gender) X 2 (Attorney 
Age) X 2 (Attorney Goal) ANOVA on the Dominance Scale 
Experimental Condition 
Female    Male    Total Participant  
N M SD 
 
N M SD 
 
N M SD 
Female Attorney       
 
      
 
      
 
Younger Attorney 
   
        
  
Agentic Goal 28 4.21 1.00 
 
37 4.29 0.89 
 
65 4.26 0.93 
  
Communal Goal 38 4.08 1.27 
 
35 3.99 1.02 
 
73 4.04 1.15 
  
Total Goal 66 4.13 1.16 
 
72 4.15 0.96 
 
138 4.14 1.06 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 28 3.85 0.99 
 
38 3.98 1.01 
 
66 3.92 0.99 
  
Communal Goal 22 3.56 1.23 
 
36 3.91 1.04 
 
58 3.78 1.12 
  
Total Goal 50 3.72 1.10 
 
74 3.95 1.02 
 
124 3.86 1.05 
 
Total  Attorney Age 
           
  
Agentic Goal 56 4.03 1.00 
 
75 4.14 0.96 
 
131 4.09 0.97 
  
Communal Goal 60 3.89 1.27 
 
71 3.95 1.03 
 
131 3.92 1.14 
  
Total Goal 116 3.96 1.15 
 
146 4.05 0.99 
 
262 4.01 1.06 
Male Attorney 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 14 4.36 1.13 
 
44 4.16 1.07 
 
58 4.21 1.08 
  
Communal Goal 27 3.51 1.19 
 
38 3.99 1.14 
 
65 3.79 1.18 
  
Total Goal 41 3.80 1.22 
 
82 4.08 1.10 
 
123 3.99 1.15 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 26 3.88 0.93 
 
38 3.98 1.01 
 
66 4.07 1.15 
  
Communal Goal 22 3.91 0.97 
 
36 3.91 1.04 
 
70 3.96 0.95 
  
Total Goal 48 3.90 0.94 
 
74 3.95 1.02 
 
136 4.01 1.05 
 
Total Attorney Age 
           
  
Agentic Goal 40 4.05 1.01 
 
84 4.17 1.16 
 
124 4.13 1.11 
  
Communal Goal 49 3.69 1.10 
 
86 3.98 1.04 
 
135 3.88 1.07 
  
Total Goal 89 3.85 1.07 
 
170 4.08 1.10 
 
259 4.00 1.09 
Total Attorney Gender 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 42 4.26 1.03 
 
81 4.22 0.99 
 
123 4.23 1.00 
  
Communal Goal 65 3.84 1.26 
 
73 3.99 1.08 
 
138 3.92 1.17 
  
Total Goal 107 4.00 1.19 
 
154 4.11 1.04 
 
261 4.07 1.10 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 54 3.86 0.95 
 
78 4.09 1.14 
 
132 4.00 1.07 
  
Communal Goal 44 3.73 1.11 
 
84 3.95 0.99 
 
128 3.88 1.03 
  
Total Goal 98 3.81 1.02 
 
162 4.02 1.06 
 
260 3.94 1.05 
 
Total  Attorney Age 
           
  
Agentic Goal 96 4.04 1.00 
 
159 4.16 1.07 
 
255 4.11 1.04 
  
Communal Goal 109 3.80 1.20 
 
157 3.97 1.03 
 
266 3.90 1.10 
    Total Goal 205 3.91 1.11   316 4.06 1.05   521 4.00 1.08 
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Table 18 
Means and Standard Deviations for 2 (Participant's Gender)X 2 (Attorney Gender) X 2 (Attorney 
Age) X 2 (Attorney Goal) ANOVA on the Opinion Measure 
Experimental Condition 
Female    Male    Total Participant 
N M SD 
 
N M SD 
 
N M SD 
Female Attorney       
 
      
 
      
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 27 5.81 1.30 
 
37 6.16 1.14 
 
64 6.02 1.22 
  
Communal Goal 38 6.08 1.12 
 
35 6.14 0.94 
 
73 6.11 1.04 
  
Total Goal 65 5.97 1.20 
 
72 6.15 1.04 
 
137 6.07 1.12 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 28 5.96 1.04 
 
38 6.08 1.60 
 
66 6.03 1.38 
  
Communal Goal 22 6.14 1.25 
 
36 6.19 1.06 
 
58 6.17 1.13 
  
Total Goal 50 6.04 1.24 
 
74 6.14 1.36 
 
124 6.10 1.27 
 
Total  Attorney Age 
           
  
Agentic Goal 55 5.89 1.17 
 
75 6.12 1.39 
 
130 6.02 1.30 
  
Communal Goal 60 6.10 1.16 
 
71 6.17 1.00 
 
131 6.14 1.07 
  
Total Goal 115 6.00 1.16 
 
146 6.14 1.21 
 
261 6.08 1.19 
Male Attorney 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 14 6.50 0.65 
 
44 6.11 0.90 
 
58 6.21 0.85 
  
Communal Goal 28 6.64 0.56 
 
38 5.67 1.36 
 
66 6.09 1.19 
  
Total Goal 42 6.60 0.59 
 
82 5.91 1.15 
 
124 6.15 1.04 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 26 5.73 1.54 
 
40 5.90 1.43 
 
66 5.83 1.46 
  
Communal Goal 22 6.27 0.99 
 
48 5.81 1.25 
 
70 5.96 1.19 
  
Total Goal 48 5.98 1.33 
 
88 5.85 1.33 
 
136 5.90 1.32 
 
Total Attorney Age 
           
  
Agentic Goal 40 6.00 1.34 
 
84 6.01 1.18 
 
124 6.01 1.23 
  
Communal Goal 50 6.48 0.79 
 
86 5.76 1.29 
 
136 6.02 1.18 
  
Total Goal 90 6.27 1.09 
 
170 5.88 1.24 
 
260 6.02 1.20 
Total Attorney Gender 
           
 
Younger Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 41 6.05 1.16 
 
81 6.14 1.01 
 
122 6.11 1.06 
  
Communal Goal 66 6.32 .96 
 
73 5.90 1.19 
 
139 6.10 1.11 
  
Total Goal 107 6.21 1.05 
 
154 6.03 1.10 
 
261 6.10 1.08 
 
Older Attorney 
           
  
Agentic Goal 54 5.85 1.30 
 
78 5.99 1.51 
 
132 5.93 1.42 
  
Communal Goal 44 6.20 1.11 
 
84 5.98 1.18 
 
128 6.05 1.16 
  
Total Goal 98 6.01 1.22 
 
162 5.98 1.34 
 
260 5.99 1.30 
 
Total  Attorney Age 
           
  
Agentic Goal 95 5.94 1.24 
 
159 6.06 1.28 
 
254 6.02 1.26 
  
Communal Goal 110 6.27 1.02 
 
157 5.94 1.18 
 
267 6.08 1.13 
    Total Goal 205 6.12 1.14   316 6.00 1.23   521 6.05 1.19 
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Table 19 
Correlations Between Measures 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Opinion Measure __ .52** -.03   .37** .51** .21** -.27** 
2. Attorney Dominance Scale .52** __ .11** .61** .80** .42** -.41** 
3. Attorney Communion Scale -.03 .11** __ -.03 -.03 .27** .28** 
4. Attorney Persuasiveness- 
Competence Scale 
.37** .61** -.03 __ .53** .46** -.38** 
5. Strength of Message .51** .80** -.03 .53** __ .32** -.45** 
6. Message Emotional Intensity .21** .42** .27** .46** .32** __ -.26** 
7. Message Boringness  -.27** -.41** .28** -.38** -.45** -.26** ___ 
Note. N's ranged from 522 to 524**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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